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Essays in Bayesian Games

Abstract : This PhD dissertation provides a series of essays in Bayesian games. It centers its attention on the role of information in the outcomes of such games, from strategies and equilibrium to welfare implications. Broadly speaking, Bayesian games are strategic situations in which there is incomplete information regarding a payoff relevant state. Players have a prior belief about the unknown parameter, and they receive information about the state before choosing their actions. Players are called Bayesian because they update their information using Bayes rule. Traditionally, the information players receive is assumed to be exogenous and correctly understood. This PhD dissertation explores the implications and consequences of giving up these assumptions.The three core chapters of this thesis tackle two different issues related to information. On the one hand, it is no longer assumed that players receive exogenously given information about the unknown state, but that they have to gather it while incurring a cost. This assumption drives the contributions and results of chapters 3 and 4. On the other hand, in chapter 5 it is no longer assumed that information distributed among the players is well understood. That is, I consider that players receive bias and correlated information and that they are not fully aware of it.
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Submitted on : Thursday, March 11, 2021 - 4:52:33 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, May 6, 2021 - 4:19:44 PM
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  • HAL Id : tel-03167045, version 1



Alfonso Montes Sanchez. Essays in Bayesian Games. Methods and statistics. Institut Polytechnique de Paris, 2020. English. ⟨NNT : 2020IPPAX096⟩. ⟨tel-03167045⟩



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